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Reversibility, Proportionality and Conflicting Rights: Fernández 
Martínez v. Spain   
 
Ian Leigh
1
 
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For many years the European Court of Human Rights could be said to be 
‘shadow-boxing’ where clashing rights cases involving religion were concerned - 
feinting and engaging in manoeuvres that were at times either ambiguous or 
misleading. Following a series of recent decisions involving church employees, 
culminating in the Grand Chamber decision which is the focus of this chapter, 
Fernández Martínez v Spain,
 2
 all that has changed. We can now say, both that the 
Court has confronted a number of genuine clashing rights cases and, moreover, that it 
has changed its approach to resolving freedom of religion cases in which rights are 
said to conflict.  
 
In a line of early cases in which employees invoked Article 9 ECHR, the 
Court resorted to ‘definitional’ or ‘categorical’ balancing techniques, notably 
employing the so-called (and now apparently abandoned) ‘specific situation’ rule.3  In 
effect this amounted to refusal of claims brought by employees of interference with 
                                                 
1
 Professor of Law, Durham University. 
I am grateful to Eva Brems, Stijn Smet and Gavin Phillipson for comments and to the participants in 
the Symposium on Conflicts between Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 
University of Ghent, 16 October 2014) for comments on an earlier draft and in particular my co-
panellists Javier Martinez-Torrón  and Judge Inita Ziemele. 
2
 Unless otherwise stated all references are to the Grand Chamber Decision, App no 6030/07, 12 June 
2014. References to the ‘Joint Dissenting Opinion’ are to the joint opinion of Judges Spielmann, Sajó, 
Karakas, Jemmens, Jaderblom, Verhabovic, Dedov and Saiz-Arnaiz. 
3
 The Court of Human Rights in Kalaç v. Turkey (1999) 27 EHRR 552 held that the dismissal of a 
senior legal adviser in the Turkish air force did not violate Art. 9. He had been dismissed for having 
adopted ‘unlawful fundamentalist opinions’. The Court held that the complainant had voluntarily 
accepted limitations on manifestation of his beliefs in embracing a system of military discipline: ‘in 
exercising his freedom to manifest his religion, an individual may need to take his specific situation 
into account’ (para. 27). The limitations here on his rights, said the Court, were self-chosen. See also: 
Stedman v. United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR CD 168; Kontinnen v. Finland, App no 24949/94, 3 
December 1996; Ahmad v. United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 126; Karaduman v. Turkey, App no 
16278/90, (1993) 74 DR 93.  
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their religious liberty, based on freedom of contract or implied waiver grounds.4 The 
reasoning was that, since the claimants voluntarily entered the employment in 
question (and were free to resign), any adverse consequences for their religious 
practice - such as inability to attend prayers or to observe holy days - were easily 
avoided. While it was not surprising that the Court concluded that an employee who 
accepts certain conditions of employment is not entitled to unilaterally rewrite them to 
suit his or her religious practices, its reasoning was nonetheless striking. In the 
relevant decisions, the conclusion was reached not by applying the principle that 
Article 9(2) permits limits on religious liberty to safeguard the rights and freedom of 
others (in this instance, the employer) but, rather, by  finding that the applicants’ 
freedom of religion was not interfered with in the first place. The petitioners were 
unable to invoke Article 9 because they had the freedom to make different choices—
ones more conducive to their religious practice—prior to accepting employment. This 
resulted in potential clashes of rights being side-stepped so that they were not directly 
confronted by the ECtHR.  
Elsewhere, I have argued that some of the examples most often said to involve 
clashing rights – especially in relation to ostensible clashes of freedom of expression 
and religion –turn out to be nothing of the kind when subjected to closer analysis. 5 By 
this I mean that it could not be argued convincingly that the Court was presented with 
a credible choice between two alternative courses, each of which was soundly based 
on upholding a Convention right (what I term the ‘reversibility test’).6 Rather there 
has been a regrettable tendency to refer to the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ in a 
loose and generalised way.7 By contrast, the reversibility test stipulates that the Court 
should ask itself whether if the state were to give priority to the less favoured right, 
would another disappointed person have an admissible Convention claim? Put another 
way, can we identify the ‘others’ whose rights and freedoms are being protected by 
the state at the cost of applicants? If the ‘other’ cannot be identified in this specific 
                                                 
4
 S. Van Drooghenbroeck, ‘Conflict and consent: Does the theory of waiver of fundamental rights offer 
solutions to settle their conflicts?’ (ch. 3 above). 
5
 I.  Leigh, ‘Damned if they do, Damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Protection of Religion from Attack’ (2011) 17 Res Publica 55.  
6
 See also I. Leigh and A. Hambler, ‘Religious Symbols, Conscience and the Rights of Others’, (2014) 
3 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2-24 (hereafter Leigh and Hambler, ‘Religious Symbols’), 
arguing that the ECtHR’s reasoning in Ladele v UK does not satisfy the test. 
7
 Cf. J. Bomhoff, ‘The Rights and Freedoms of Others: The ECHR and its Peculiar Category of 
Conflicts between Fundamental Rights' in Eva Brems (ed.) Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights 
(Antwerp- Oxford: Intersentia, 2008) (hereafter Bomhoff, ‘The Rights and Freedoms of Others’).  
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and narrow sense then arguably no legitimate aim for a restriction exists in the first 
place and there is no need to consider questions to do with the legal quality or 
proportionality of the restriction. The reversibility test plays an important part in the 
argument in this Chapter and I will return to it in greater detail to argue that it could 
have provided a more satisfactory basis for determining what weight was to be given 
to religious autonomy compared to respect for private and family life – the question 
faced by the European Court of Human Rights in Fernández Martínez v Spain. First, 
however, I will examine how proportional balancing was employed by the Grand 
Chamber in that decision and, secondly, whether a definitional balancing approach 
would have been preferable. 
  
 
Balancing in the Grand Chamber 
 
As other Chapters in this book elaborate more fully a broad distinction can be drawn 
between two judicial techniques for resolving conflicts of rights.
8
 On the one hand, 
‘definitional’ (or ‘categorical’) approaches focus on careful stipulation of the scope or 
applicability of the relevant rights to avoid overlap. On the other hand, ‘proportional 
balancing’ resolves conflicts by acknowledging the applicability of the conflicting 
rights more broadly but then weighing between them in the particular factual context. 
In the case of the qualified rights under the ECHR (Articles 8 and 9 in the context of 
this discussion) the definitional approach directs judicial attention to whether there 
has been an ‘interference’ with the right to respect for private and family life or the 
right to thought, conscience and religion- Articles 8(1) and 9(1) respectively.  
Conversely ‘proportional balancing’ lays stress on the limitations for protecting ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’, where this is necessary in the interests of a democratic 
society, under Articles 8(2) and 9(2). Focus is not so much on whether there has been 
an interference with the right in question but, rather, on whether the interference is 
justified. 
9
 
 
                                                 
8
 See Chapters 1 and 2 above. 
9
 The discussion of the reversibility test below makes clear that this broad distinction, although useful, 
is a simplification. Definitional techniques can be brought to bear to elucidate  the scope of ‘the rights 
and freedoms of others’ (below described as ‘pure’ reversibility). Equally, however reversibility can 
take a more qualified form- ascribing greater weight in balancing to ‘rights and freedoms of others’ 
where the test is satisfied. 
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These two approaches have differing implications for the role of national courts in 
conflicting rights cases under the Convention system.  A definitional approach leaves 
relatively little flexibility to national courts to diverge from the Strasbourg 
interpretation of what constitutes an interference with a qualified right. It is axiomatic 
that Convention rights cannot have different meanings throughout member states, 
although the means of protecting them may, of course, differ.   A national court that 
applied a different understanding of the scope of the conflicting rights to that in the 
Convention jurisprudence would inevitably be characterised as failing to protect one 
of the right-holders, raising the possibility of a successful application to the European 
Court. Proportional balancing, however, allows some space for varying protection, 
under the margin of appreciation, not least because national circumstances form part 
of the context in which weighing or balancing occurs. This in turn raises questions 
about the respective roles of domestic institutions and the Strasbourg Court. Placing 
primary responsibility for balancing rights onto municipal courts in member states 
may be seen as consistent with the ‘Fourth Instance’ role of the ECtHR but the looser 
the supervision that the Court exercises, the weaker protection given to rights. If 
national bodies have too much latitude to balance between conflicting rights there is a 
serious risk that enjoyment of Convention rights will vary throughout the member 
states. 
 
 
The Grand Chamber’s decision Fernández Martínez is best understood as a step in   a 
gradual process by which the Court , has moved from definitional to proportional 
balancing and, overcoming its earlier hesitancy, has confronted clashes between 
religion and other rights more directly. Early indications of the change appeared in a 
group of church autonomy cases from Germany in which the Court resorted to ad hoc 
balancing of rights using the proportionality test.
10
 It was, however, unclear from 
these examples whether this was by conscious choice or merely because the domestic 
courts in those cases had themselves approached the issue in that way. The Court’s 
decision in Eweida and Others v UK dispelled this doubt and confirmed that 
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 Siebenhaar v Germany, App no 18136/02,  3 February 2011 (hereafter Siebenhaar v Germany) .  
And see with reference to Art 8: Obst v Germany, App no 425/03, 23 September 2010 (hereafter Obst v 
Germany) ; Schüth v Germany, App no 1620/03,  23 September 2010 (hereafter . Schüth v Germany).  
See further: I Leigh, ‘Balancing Religious Autonomy and Other Human Rights under the European 
Convention’ (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 109 (hereafter, Leigh ‘Balancing Religious 
Autonomy’) and chapter  2 by Stijn Smet in this volume. 
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proportional balancing is indeed now the preferred method of disposing of religious 
clash of rights cases at least in an employment context.
11
 In a passage confirming its 
change of approach the Court stated: 
 
Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court 
considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of 
religion in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of changing 
job would negate any interference with the right, the better approach would be 
to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not 
the restriction was proportionate.
12
 
 
This was a significant development in the approach to Article 9 in clashing rights 
cases. Following Eweida the religious employee’s situation no longer acts as a 
filtering device for Article 9(1) and is instead one of the considerations relevant in 
weighting the claim under Article 9(2).
13
 The abandonment of definitional balancing 
will necessarily require the Court to focus more often on applying Article 9(2) and to 
engage in the more sophisticated process of seeking to reconcile potentially 
competing rights. Despite that, in other respects Eweida itself was a rather under-
developed  and disappointing example of the balancing approach to clashing rights. In 
the most difficult of the four joined cases (Ladele,
14
 the marriage registrar case) the 
treatment of proportionality was cursory and cryptic and (in characteristic fashion) 
more reliant on the margin of appreciation than on sustained analysis.
15
  
 
By contrast, with the majority and minority judgments of the Grand Chamber 
in Fernández Martínez v. Spain we now have a much more developed example of 
proportionality analysis in an Article 9 clashing rights case. Unlike Eweida, however,  
Article 9 was not invoked directly by the applicant but, rather, by the Spanish 
government, which claimed that protecting the religious autonomy of the Catholic 
church justified limiting his right to respect for private and family life under Article 
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 Eweida and Ors v. United Kingdom Application Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 
ECHR 37 (15 January 2013) (hereafter Eweida v. UK). This was a group of four joined petitions arising 
from unsuccessful religious discrimination employment claims.  
12
 Eweida v. UK (n 11), para. 83. 
13
 Ibid.,para.83.  Thus in the Eweida group of cases McFarlane’s decision to seek a role (in giving sex 
counselling) which could be reasonably anticipated to conflict with his religious beliefs weighed 
against him (Ibid., para.109) whereas the fact that Ladele’s employer (in the marriage registrar case) 
had unilaterally varied the contract of employment to create the situation giving rise to the religious 
objection counted to an extent in her favour ( Eweida v. UK (n 11), para.106). 
14
 See further chapters  5 and 4 above by Russell Sandberg and Dolores Morondo Taramundi 
respectively. 
15
 Leigh and Hambler, ‘Religious Symbols’ (n 6).  
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8.2 in the interests of the rights and freedoms of others.
16
 Both the majority and the 
minority accepted that the non-renewal of the applicant’s contract to teach religious 
education was for a legitimate aim within Article 8.2 for plausible reasons connected 
with religious autonomy. The choice facing the Grand Chamber was over how much 
recognition the Spanish courts should give to autonomy: whether (as Javier Martínez-
Torrón argues in his chapter)
17
 it should effectively be absolute because of the 
cumulative effect of the applicant’s free choices, or whether a more nuanced approach 
should apply. In the event all the judges opted for the latter course, although there was 
disagreement between the majority and minority over whether the combination of 
factors justified a proportionate restriction on the applicant’s right to private and 
family life.
18
 
Before analyzing the Grand Chamber’s approach in greater detail it is helpful 
to provide some background on the place of religious autonomy under the 
Convention. The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Article 9 
underpins religious autonomy in two related ways. Firstly, the text of Article 9 itself 
refers to ‘freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, 
to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance’. The 
associative aspect of religion has led the Court to draw a direct link between freedom 
from interference in the internal affairs of religious groups and the enjoyment of the 
right by individuals. To force a religious community to accept or keep in membership 
someone whose views or behaviour is incompatible with the community’s religious 
doctrine can be seen as an interference with religious freedom of other individuals, 
especially as regards their choices of association. Secondly, religious autonomy is 
asserted by religious communities as groups in which they seek the right to determine 
                                                 
16
 For a more detailed account of the factual background see 000-000 (Martinez-Torrón ), above. 
17
 000 above. 
18
 More recently the Second Section of the Court has applied the majority’s approach to an 
unsuccessful similar application brought by a Croatian religious education teacher: Case of Travaŝ v. 
Croatia (Appl. 75581/13),  4 October 2016 (hereafter Travaŝ v. Croatia ) . The applicant, who was a 
layman rather than a priest, had been dismissed under similar arrangements for teaching religious 
education between the Catholic church and the state in Croatia. The applicant’s canonical mandate had 
been withdrawn  when he remarried, having obtained a civil divorce, but without seeking or obtaining 
an annulment of his first marriage by the religious authorities. Following a similar approach to the 
Fernández Martínez  case the Court found that there had been an interference with the applicant’s 
private life but that this had been prescribed by law, for the protection of rights and freedoms of others 
and necessary in a democratic society. 
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their own structure, personnel, policy, objectives, and so on.
19
 It is here that the 
possibility of conflict between the individual members of the religion or its workers 
and the religious organization or community can result in clashes between religious 
autonomy and other human rights. Both these aspects can be seen at work in the 
Court’s pronouncement in Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria: 
 
religious communities traditionally and universally exist in organised 
structures . . . Participation in the life of a community is . . . a 
manifestation of one’s religion, protected by Article 9 of the 
Convention. Where the organisation of religious community is at issue, 
Article 9 must be interpreted in light of Article 11 of the Convention 
which safeguards associative life against unjustified State interference. 
Seen in this perspective, the believer’s right to freedom of religion 
encompasses the expectation that the community will be allowed to 
function peacefully free from arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the 
autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for 
pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart 
of the protection which Article 9 affords. It directly concerns not only 
the organisation of the community as such but also the effective 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion by all its active members. 
Were the organisational life of the community not protected by Article 
9 of the Convention, all other aspects of the individual’s freedom of 
religion would become vulnerable.
20
 
 
As noted above, religious group autonomy requires that there are clear limits 
to the freedom of individuals. Within the Convention framework there are (at least) 
four different routes to that outcome, however. These are based on (respectively): 
competence ratione personae; the right to resign a post or exit from a religious 
community; the fiction of voluntary surrender of rights; and proportional balancing. 
Approaching the question from the point of view of admissibility, the ECHR 
makes a clear distinction between state institutions (which can be liable for human 
rights violations) and non-state actors. That distinction can be seen in an admissibility 
decision of the European Commission in which it declared as manifestly ill-founded a 
complaint that a prohibition concerning the form of liturgy to be used in the Church of 
                                                 
19
 The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of  Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief 1981 recognizes this, specifying, for instance, the right to ‘train, appoint, elect, or 
designate by succession appropriate leaders’ (Article 6(g)). 
20
 (2002) 34 EHRR 554, para.62. See similarly Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v 
Bulgaria, App no 39023/97, 16 December 2004,  para.73. 
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Sweden (at that time an established church) violated Article 9.
21
 It follows that if 
religious communities are to be treated at the Strasbourg level as interfering with 
human rights it must be in the context of state responsibility or positive obligations, 
with due attention to the impact on their own autonomy, rather than as defendants in 
their own right. An example would be Sindicatul Pastorul Cel Bun v Romania in 
which the Grand Chamber (by a majority of 11 to 6) found that the refusal of the 
authorities to register a trade union for clergy and laity of the Romanian Orthodox 
Church interfered with Article 11 but was for a legitimate aim (protection of the rights 
and freedoms of the orthodox church), was prescribed by law and proportionate.
22
 
Secondly, an individual's freedom to leave a religious organization in the 
event of a dispute can be fatal to bringing a religious liberty claim against it under the 
Convention. The European Court's longstanding position invokes the right of exit for 
dissidents: 
 
In accordance with the principle of autonomy, the State is prohibited from 
obliging a religious community to admit new members or to exclude existing 
ones. Similarly, Article 9 of the Convention does not guarantee any right to 
dissent within a religious body; in the event of a disagreement over matters of 
doctrine or organisation between a religious community and one of its members, 
the individual’s freedom of religion is exercised through his freedom to leave 
the community.
23
 
 
For example, in Williamson v UK a claim by a Church of England priest that the 
ordination of women breached his Article 9 rights was held by the European 
Commission to be manifestly ill-founded since he  had the option of leaving the 
ministry or the church and that nothing had been done, strictly speaking, to punish or 
coerce him.
24
 To emphasize the right of exit in this way gives practical effect to the 
principle of voluntariness as an important basis for religious liberty. The combined 
effect of these two approaches is to leave little if any opportunity for dissident 
                                                 
21
 Hautaniemi v Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR CD155, arising from the prohibition on use of a form of 
liturgy in the Finnish Evangelical-Lutheran Church (the parish was Finnish-speaking).But see Holy 
Monasteries v.  Greece (1995) 20 EHRR 1 in which a Church body was regarded as ‘non-
governmental’ in nature so as to be able to apply at Strasbourg. 
22
 Sindicatul Pastorul Cel Bun v Romania [2013] ECHR 646 (GC) (9 July 2013) (hereafter . Sindicatul  
Pastorul Cel Bun v Romania ).  
23
 Sindicatul Pastorul Cel Bun v Romania  (n 22), para. 137. 
24
 Williamson v UK, App no 27008/9. Furthermore, rights under Art 9 were not absolute and in this 
instance the Church’s legislation was plainly ‘prescribed by law’ and could be said either to be for the 
‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ (namely women within the church) or for the 
‘protection of morals’ (in following its view of Scripture). The church’s action was also consistent with 
the elimination of discrimination under Art 14 of the Convention. 
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individuals or congregations to use Article 9 of the Convention against church 
episcopal or denominational authorities in doctrinal, liturgical, or disciplinary 
disputes. In Fernández Martínez v. Spain the application was clearly brought against 
the Spanish authorities because of their own actions in giving effect to ecclesiastical 
decisions and so neither  of these approaches (ratione personae and the right of exit) 
was applicable.  
 
A third approach addresses specifically the position of servants and employees 
of religious organizations. In some early decisions the Convention organs tended to 
remove disputes between ministers of religion and their religious denomination from 
Article 9, on the basis that the individual in effect surrendered his or her individual 
rights as a condition of service. 
A church is an organised religious community based on identical or at 
least substantially similar views. Through the rights granted to its 
members under Art. 9, the church itself is protected in its right to 
manifest its religion, to organise and carry out worship, teaching 
practice and observance, and it is free to act out and enforce uniformity 
in these matters. . . . [The church’s servants’] individual freedom of 
thought, conscience or religion is exercised at the moment they accept 
or refuse employment as clergymen, and their right to leave the church 
guarantees their freedom of religion in case they oppose its teachings. 
In other words, the church is not obliged to provide religious freedom 
to its servants and members, as is the State as such for everyone within 
its jurisdiction.
25
  
 
Closely similar to (if not a sub-category) of the ‘specific situation’ rule previously 
applied in other contexts, this was essentially a ‘definitional balancing’ approach to 
clashes of individual and collective religious freedom.  
 
As we have seen, however, the European Court has moved steadily away from a 
definitional limitation approach, notably in a recent group of church autonomy cases 
from Germany in which it has resorted instead to ad hoc balancing using the 
proportionality test.
26
 In Siebenhaar v Germany
27
 the Court confronted this question 
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 X v Denmark (1976) (1976) 5 DR 157, 158. 
26
 Leigh ‘Balancing Religious Autonomy’ (n 10); C. Evans and A. Hood, 'Religious Autonomy and 
Labour Law: A Comparison of the Jurisprudence of the United States and the European Court of 
Human Rights', (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 81-107 (hereafter Evans and Hood 
‘Religious Autonomy and Labour Law’). 
27
 Siebenhaar v Germany (n 10).. 
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in the case of a worker employed at a nursery run by a Protestant parish who was 
dismissed because her involvement in teaching catechism classes at the Universal 
Church/Brotherhood of Humanity was deemed incompatible with her duty of loyalty 
towards the Protestant Church. The Strasbourg Court found that the German Courts, 
which had ultimately rejected the applicant's employment law challenge, had correctly 
balanced her right of religious freedom against the Church’s. For the domestic courts 
to give priority to the Church’s rights because the implications of the applicant’s 
behaviour for its credibility and public stance did not breach Article 9(2). A similar 
approach was taken in two parallel cases involving the dismissal of employees of 
religious organizations for adultery (which raise the question of conflict between the 
autonomy of religious organizations on the one hand and the right to private life of the 
employees concerned).
28
  
Against this background the judgments in Fernández Martínez show a high 
measure of agreement between the majority and minority of the Grand Chamber about 
most of the relevant attributes of religious autonomy under the Article 9 
jurisprudence. Firstly, that autonomy is vital not only to the collective right of the 
religious organisation but also the freedom of religion of individual members (in the 
sense that they can choose to belong to a religion with these beliefs and practices).
29
 
Secondly, that the State should defer to how religious communities react (in 
accordance with their own interests or rights) to dissident movements that might pose 
a threat to the ‘cohesion, image or unity’ of the organisation.30 Thirdly, that there is no 
discretion (or only very exceptionally) for the state to determine whether the means of 
expressing religious beliefs are legitimate.
31
 Fourthly, autonomy prevents the State 
requiring religious community to admit or exclude an individual or to entrust them 
with a religious duty.
32
 
To these agreed principles the minority add the qualifications that courts 
considering religious autonomy claims have a role in determining that decisions are 
‘duly reasoned’ and ‘not arbitrary’ and do not produce effects which are a 
disproportionate interference, in addition to being for a purpose related to autonomy.
33
 
                                                 
28
 Obst v Germany (n 10) and Schüth v Germany (n 10).  
29
 Fernández Martínez, para. 127. 
30
 Fernández Martínez,para. 128. 
31
 Fernández Martínez,para. 129. 
32
 Fernández Martínez,para. 129. 
33
 Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 21. 
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In a separate Dissenting Opinion Judge Sajó went further and argued that it was 
incumbent on the Church authorities to provide a ‘translation’ of the religious reasons 
underlying their decision since: 
‘Adequate judicial supervision cannot be provided unless religious 
considerations which affect civil or public law can be made legally 
cognisable for the benefit of the judicial authority. … This principle 
does not call into question the veracity of a Church’s positions, but 
rather concerns their applicability in civil and public relations.’34  
It was accepted on both sides that religious communities are entitled to 
demand ‘a certain degree of loyalty’ from workers or representatives. This factor is 
contextual and opens the possibility of differing outcomes under the proportionality 
analysis, depending on the exact role of the person concerned.
35
 The ‘voluntary 
acceptance’ by the applicant of a special duty of loyalty was relevant,36 but as a factor 
with regard to necessity of interference to protect the rights and freedoms of others, 
rather than as a definitional factor (as it had been under earlier applications of the 
specific situation principle to workers in religious organisations). 
An important difference emerged, however, in the application of the loyalty 
principle.  The majority of the Grand Chamber rejected the applicant’s argument that 
his duty had not been breached because he had not contradicted Catholic teaching in 
his religious education classes, since in their view the church was entitled to also 
consider his way of life and public statements.
37
 The majority argued that the Church 
had been entitled to take account of remarks attributed to the applicant because of the 
very close proximity between the Church’s proclamatory mission and the applicant’s 
activity.
38
 The minority, on the other hand, treated this aspect of religious autonomy 
as less important because of their emphasis on the fact that the applicant had a dual 
status and was formally employed by the Ministry of Education. It was the Ministry’s 
decision rather than the bishop’s that was central to their analysis.39 (As Martínez-
Torrón explains in his chapter, the applicant’s contract had not been renewed under 
                                                 
34
 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sajó, para. 5. The impact of the theoretical literature about ‘public 
reason’ on use of the concept of ‘translation’ is clear (Cf J. Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’ 
(2006) 14 European Journal of Philosophy 1; J. Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) 
U Chicago Law Review 765, 783-4). 
35
 Fernández Martínez, para. 131. 
36
 Fernández Martínez, para. 135. 
37
 Fernández Martínez, para. 138. 
38
 Fernández Martínez, para. 140. 
39
 E.g. paras. 30 and 35 of the Joint Dissenting Opinion. 
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the terms of the Agreement between Spain and the Holy See because the Ministry of 
Education followed the bishop’s opinion that he was not suitable.) 
  The applicant claimed that the fact his salary was paid by the state
40
 should 
result in greater weight being given to his Article 8 right and that this distinguished 
the case from earlier decisions on religious autonomy with regard to workers.
41
 To an 
extent the majority of the Grand Chamber accepted this argument, holding that the 
proper approach to the case was not (as the Chamber had followed)
42
 through the 
state’s positive obligations when acting through its courts, but rather the state’s 
involvement in its guise as an employer in giving effect to the bishop’s decision.43 
This involvement, the majority accepted, set the case somewhat apart from the earlier 
German religious autonomy cases since private life and religious autonomy were to be 
weighed by the state employer rather than just solely by the courts. Nonetheless there 
was a wide margin of appreciation because of the variety of constitutional models 
governing relations between the State and religious denominations.
44
 The majority 
found that the domestic courts had taken into account all relevant factors related to the 
proportionality exercise, although the Constitutional Court had deferred to the 
ecclesiastical authorities on various matters (cf Obst and Siebenhaar and contrast 
Schüth and Lombardi Vallauri on this point).
45
 The domestic courts had, the majority 
concluded, weighed the relevant aspects in sufficient detail. They pointed to the 
doctrine of religious neutrality applied by the Constitutional Court under which 
Spanish courts were not required to defer if the Bishop had acted for reasons other 
than strictly religious ones, and that the courts had verified that he had not done so.
46
  
In contrast the minority judgment treats the relationship under the Agreement 
between the Ministry of Education and the bishop as constituting a form of 
‘delegation’ by the Spanish State of the powers to appoint teachers to the Church, for 
which it nonetheless remained responsible. For the minority it was the Ministry of 
Education’s action in giving effect to the bishop’s decision which was critical. The 
                                                 
40
 Indirectly at that time- see Fernández Martínez, para. 85. 
41
 Fernández Martínez, para. 75. 
42
 Fernández Martínez v Spain,  Application 56030/ 07, (Third Section, 15 May 2012),  paras. 78-79. 
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 Fernández Martínez, para. 115; and see Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 12. 
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 Fernández Martínez, para. 130. 
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46
 Fernández Martínez, paras. 150 and 151. 
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applicant was to be regarded as having a ‘double status’ – an employee of a public 
education authority and also owing an obligation to the Catholic church.
47
  
 
[W]hatever the consequences under canon law, it was for the Ministry, and later 
for the domestic courts, to make sure that the secular reaction to the Bishop’s 
decision was adapted to the applicant’s situation and in particular that it did not 
interfere disproportionately with his right to respect for his private and family 
life 
48
  
 
Since the Ministry had simply endorsed the bishop’s decision, the dissenting judges 
found no evidence that it had taken into account the applicant’s right to respect for 
private life or the effects of the decision on that right.
49
 Nor had it considered whether 
there were alternative measures available (such as employing the applicant in a 
different capacity) or whether there was a less restrictive way in which to give effect 
to the bishop’s decision other than to dismiss the applicant.50 Consequently in the 
minority’s view it had not been demonstrated that the interference with the applicant’s 
right to respect for private and family life was proportionate. 
Having analysed the respective approaches towards proportional balancing in the 
Grand Chamber’s decision, I will now discuss the question of whether, after all, a 
definitional approach would have been better. 
 
Comparing balancing approaches 
 
 
Commentators commonly claim a number of benefits that follow from using 
proportionality or ad hoc reasoning to resolve conflicts of rights.
51
 The technique 
eschews zero sum solutions: it acknowledges the importance and relevance of both 
rights while determining which takes priority in a particular factual context and 
acknowledging that minor factual differences could tip the balance in the other 
direction. This has particular benefits in relation to disputes involving religion, which 
                                                 
47
 Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 30. 
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 Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 36. 
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 Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 26. 
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 Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 35. 
51
 See the helpful discussion in M. Pearson, Proportionality, Equality Laws and Religion: Religious 
Objections to Equality Laws in England, Canada, and the US, (Routledge, 2016), Chapter 5. 
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in contemporary society are often portrayed and felt by the adversaries to be part of a 
continuing ‘Culture War’. In this context proportionality reasoning  can help to defuse 
the aura of excessive symbolism and partisanship that often surrounds what in reality 
are relatively localised disputes that could be amenable to practical solutions in which 
neither side need lose excessively. By ‘fractioning’, proportionality can help to move 
away from a winner takes all mentality in which every legal decision is played out 
against a larger narrative about secularism or religious exceptionalism. This certainly 
has some relevance to contemporary Spain where the Culture War fault-lines have 
fallen over the position of the Catholic Church in public life. However, to use an 
appropriate metaphor: if human rights litigation was like football not every game 
would be El Clasico.
52
 As Dominic McGoldrick points out, for religions a 
proportionality approach allows engagement with other rights and values better than 
claims to total exemption.
53
  
 
The fact and context-specific nature of proportionality is often said to be one its 
strongest features. For example, this allows a court to differentiate according to the 
precise  employment or clerical status of a worker who is removed or disciplined for 
non-adherence to religious norms. As Javier Martínez-Torrón argues, closer 
adherence to religious doctrine might be expected from a priest (albeit one in a 
teaching role) than from a church organist or church nursery worker.
54
 Consequently 
the weight given to religious autonomy might be greater in Fernández Martínez than 
in Schüth or Siebenhaar. In a more recent case the Court considered the obligation of 
loyalty owed by a lay Catholic teacher of religious education in Croatia under similar 
arrangements to those in Spain.
55
 In the event it found his lay status did not absolve 
him from the obligation of loyalty but this may have been because there were other 
factors at work that distinguished his situation from Fernández Martínez.  These 
included his failure to seek annulment of his first  marriage (which had it been 
successful would have meant that he would not have been  not in breach of Canon 
law), the genuine attempts of the state authorities  to find him an alternative teaching 
role before dismissing him, and the fact that he had received compensation. Although 
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54
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the outcome was the same as in Fernández Martínez therefore the process of 
reasoning by the Court tends to support the claim that proportional balancing is 
sufficiently flexible to take account of subtle contextual differences. 
 
For some, however, the ad hoc balancing process is overly complex since it involves 
the court in weighing multiple variables which are unique to each factual situation. It 
is also argued that proportional balancing is unpredictable and that the uncertainty 
itself fuels further litigation, whereas a definitional approach to conflicting rights 
assists predictability. In the light of these criticisms, would a definitional approach 
have been better in Fernández Martínez? 
 
The argument gains some force from the somewhat artificial way in which 
Article 8 was pleaded in Strasbourg, whereas the facts surrounding the ‘scandal’ 
arising from the publicity given to the applicant’s circumstances perhaps fitted more 
naturally within the scope of the right of freedom of expression (Article 10) or of 
association (Article 11).
56
 Neither did the applicant seek to rely on the right to marry 
and found a family and so did not present a legal challenge to the Roman Catholic 
church’s celibacy rule as such.57 Rather, his case was fundamentally about public 
acknowledgement of the applicant’s marital and family status, which precipitated the 
bishop’s action against him. This invites the question whether the conflict of rights 
could not have been resolved more straightforwardly by a definitional approach – 
holding either Article 8 or Article 9 to be inapplicable – without the need for the 
tortured process of balancing. 
In  fact, all judges of the Grand Chamber agreed that Article 8 was engaged, 
though in somewhat different ways. The majority took the view that Article 8 covered 
the applicant’s right to choose to make known that he was married, when read in 
                                                 
56
 It is possible also to imagine situations in which a comparable religious education teacher might 
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conjunction with other Articles (presumably Article 12 in particular) of the 
Convention.
58
 They declined to take a definitional balancing approach (one, for 
example, which limited the applicability of Article 8 in the case of priests), arguing 
that private and professional life overlapped and that the church itself had made the 
connection between the two by referring to Christian witness as one of the attributes 
for the appointment of religious education teachers.
59
   
The minority, on the other hand, took a still wider view of the applicability of 
Article 8. They treated the interference with private life as more concerned with his 
private and family life at large, rather than turning on a specific right to publicize his 
status.
60
 It also covered the applicant’s membership of the Movement for Optional 
Celibacy and the right to make that known (which the minority describe as a 
‘manifestation’ of the right to respect for private and family life).61 The obvious 
rejoinder is that whereas the text of Article 9 refers to a qualified right to manifest 
one’s religious belief no such words appear in Article 8. The point and the difference 
may, however, be semantic – the approaches of the majority and the minority could 
perhaps both be subsumed under the notion of  ‘respect for private and family life ’ in 
any event.    
The majority depicted the applicant as ‘choosing to accept’ publicity (either by 
deliberately posing for the photograph leading to the publicity or, if it was taken 
without his consent, by not complaining about it) and associating with a protest-
oriented meeting that breached his duty of loyalty to the church.
62
 He had ‘knowingly 
placed himself’ in a situation that was incompatible with the Church’s precepts,63 all 
the more so since he must have been aware of the likely effect of the publicity, having 
regard to the period (6 years) during which he had been allowed to continue to teach 
under tolerance, notwithstanding  his married status. The minority argued, however, 
that was no evidence that the applicant was responsible for the content of the 
newspaper article referring to him or for the reported statements of others attending 
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the same meeting.
64
 They treated the interference with private life as more concerned 
with his private and family life at large, rather than turning on a specific right to 
publicize his status.
65
 
Although there are undoubted difficulties here about formulating with precision the 
way in which Article 8 was engaged,
66
 it is nonetheless clear that, just as in earlier 
cases, the Court has ruled out the argument that it is simply out of place where 
considerations of religious autonomy apply. The applicability of Article 8 was clearly 
accepted by the Court in Obst and Schüth – the two parallel German cases involving 
the dismissal of employees of religious organizations for adultery, which raise the 
question of conflict between the autonomy of religious organizations on the one hand 
and the right to private life of the employees concerned, on the other.
67
 If Article 8 
applies to pure church employees it should all the more do so where the state employs 
a person to carry out a church function, as in the facts of Fernández-Martínez. 
Equally, to argue that Article 8 should not apply where the cumulative free 
choices of an applicant concerning his personal life and career have resulted in a 
situation of conflict, would be to seek to reverse the now longstanding trend of 
Convention jurisprudence. It is now generally accepted that Article 8 protects a realm 
of personal autonomy that covers family and sexual relationships
68
 and that this does 
not draw a boundary at the workplace. For example, when the British armed forces 
policy of discharging homosexuals and lesbians was before the Court in 1999, no one 
doubted that Article 8 was engaged, despite the greater sexual freedom available to 
the applicants in civilian life.
69
 This does not mean of course that respect for private 
and family life automatically prevails over an employer’s legitimate interests if they 
satisfy Article 8.2.  
 
Moreover to argue that balancing is irrelevant wherever a church function is at stake in 
litigation would seem to require acceptance of the principle that balancing per se is an 
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interference with religious autonomy, as Javier Martinez-Torrón  argues.
70
 This would 
be equivalent to treating religious autonomy as a jurisdictional bar. There is certainly 
some US authority that regards the First Amendment in this way
71
 and in Fernández-
Martínez the intervention of some US NGOs,
72
 was seemingly aimed at persuading the 
European Court of Human Rights to follow suit. The US Supreme Court recently 
affirmed this approach in applying the so-called ‘ministerial exception’ to 
constitutional rights in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission , stating that: 
 
[w]hen a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her 
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for 
us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.
73
 
 
 
It is submitted, however, that an approach of this kind confers excessive protection for 
the (legitimate) interests of religious organisations. There is nothing to suggest that 
this is an essential component of religious autonomy the world over, rather than 
merely the way in which it takes effect under the US Constitution. To the contrary, 
there are good reasons to take a different approach under the European Convention. 
Firstly, unlike the First Amendment, Article 9 is a qualified right and therefore 
contains within Article 9.2 a procedure for reconciling competing rights according to 
whether limitations are necessary in a democratic society. Secondly, the ministerial 
exception in the US is partly an outworking of the First Amendment separation of 
church and state, under which proportional balancing is suspect because it would to 
some extent entangle the courts as state institutions in religious affairs. But a strict 
separation of church and state is not the European model. Instead the Convention 
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requires that state institutions, courts included, adopt a certain kind of neutrality 
towards religion, marked by pluralism but not secularism.
74
 
 
 Thirdly a jurisdictional bar would violate the right to a fair trial under Article 6 by 
denying religious employees a right of access to court. This can be seen from a case 
bearing some similarity to the present one (Lombardi Vallauri v Italy)
75
 in which  the 
European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Articles 10 and 6 of the ECHR 
arising from the refusal to re-employ a lecturer in legal philosophy at a Catholic 
university in Milan. The applicant had worked on temporary contracts at the 
university for in excess of 20 years but  in 1998/99 the Faculty of Law decided not to 
examine his application for an advertised vacancy since he did not have the approval 
of the Congregation for Catholic Education (one of required conditions of the post). 
The Congregation for Catholic Education, an institution of the Holy See, had written 
to the President of the University stating that some of the applicant’s views were 'in 
clear opposition to Catholic doctrine' and that 'in the interests of truth and of the well-
being of students and the University' the applicant should no longer teach there. The 
applicant’s attempts to challenge the university’s decision in the Italian courts failed, 
culminating in an unsuccessful appeal to the Consiglio di Stato. The Consiglio di 
Stato applied existing doctrine holding that requiring teaching appointments at the 
Catholic University to be subject to Vatican approval was compatible with the 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of instruction and freedom of religion.
76
 It stated 
that ‘no authority in the Republic may rule on the findings of the ecclesiastical 
authority’. By a majority of 6 to 1 the European Court found a breach of Article 6 
because the lack of reasons impaired the applicant’s effective access to a court. While 
recognition of religious autonomy could justify the university’s refusal to employ 
someone who in its view did not conform to its religious ethos, this could not extend 
to a point blank refusal to explain the basis for that conclusion.   
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It is submitted that although religious autonomy was undoubtedly a relevant factor, it 
is difficult to treat Fernández Martínez as a pure religious autonomy case, as Javier 
Martinez-Torrón  argues.
77
 The Murcia High Court noted it concerned the ‘borderline 
between the purely ecclesiastical function and a nascent employment relationship’.78 
This was not an instance where upholding the applicant's claim would result in 
requiring an unwilling religious organisation to retain a religious leader that it wished 
to remove. The validity of the dispensation that removed the applicant from ability to 
perform ministry within the Church was never in question. In fact, by the time of the 
Grand Chamber decision he had found other employment and then reached retirement 
in any event, so there was not even the possibility of reinstatement to the religious 
education post. More importantly, however, the facts stand apart from earlier religious 
autonomy cases because he was a state employee. 
 
Moreover, to treat the question of ‘scandal’ that lay at the heart of the decision not to 
renew his contract as a pure Canon law matter, which could under no circumstances 
be inquired into by a secular court, is equally problematic. It will be recalled that the 
purported basis for the non-renewal of the contract was the bishop's refusal to allow 
Mr. Fernández Martínez to continue under the Papal ‘rescript’ because the rescript 
referred to the absence of scandal. However the bishop had long been aware of the 
priest’s marital status, both at the time of first nominating him for the teaching post 
and when he had repeatedly reappointed him notwithstanding. Additionally, as the 
Public Prosecutor noted in argument before the Constitutional Court, the bishop was 
aware also of the applicant's membership of the Organisation for Optional Celibacy. 
Since the Church had been able to accept his suitability to teach during this period, 
notwithstanding the widely-known contradiction between his married status and the 
Church’s teaching on celibacy, this could call into doubt the reason for his dismissal 
or at least narrow the margin of appreciation allowed to the state to give priority to the 
religious autonomy argument. The second Joint Dissenting Opinion makes precisely 
this point.
79
  
 
                                                 
77
 As advocated by  Javier Martinez-Torrón , above 000. 
78
 Fernandez Martinez, para. 29. 
79
 See also the Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Saiz Arnuz in the Third Section decision: Fernández 
Martínez v Spain,  App no 56030/ 07, 15 May 2012  (Third Section,), para. 2. 
21 
 
If, on the other hand, the publicity were regarded as the source of the scandal rather 
than these other factors, it pre-dated the rescript which in turn sits uncomfortably with 
the argument that the bishop was acting under power in Canon Law derived from the 
rescript.
80
 (The sequence of events is highly suggestive in any event since the rescript 
was only finally issued - thirteen years after the applicant had petitioned the Vatican - 
after the publicity given to his status and participation in the meeting of the 
Organisation for Optional Celibacy.) Nothing in the notion of respect for religious 
autonomy would suggest that it must extend to retroactivity. 
 
Moreover the first Joint Dissenting Opinion points out that whereas the ‘scandal’ 
resulting from the wider publicity might be a factor for the church, it is harder to see 
how it could be relevant to his employer: the Ministry of Education. An analogy could 
perhaps be drawn here with the Court’s reasoning in Eweida v UK with regard to a 
non-religious ethos employer. Ms Eweida brought her claim to the European Court of 
Human Rights after her dismissal by her employer (British Airways) for wearing a 
visible cross around her neck contrary to the company’s uniform policy.  A breach of 
Article 9 was found because, in rejecting her claim for religious discrimination, the 
national courts had given excessive weight to the employer’s interests bearing in mind 
that British Airways had tolerated a departure from its uniform policy for an extended 
earlier period with no evidence that its interests had been adversely affected.
81
     
 
All these arguments point against treating religious autonomy claims as automatically 
conclusory. The Grand Chamber has been quite explicit about that in its Sindicatul 
‘Pastorul Cel Bun’ decision: 
 
 
In the Court’s opinion, it is the domestic courts’ task to ensure that 
both freedom of association and the autonomy of religious 
communities can be observed within such communities in accordance 
with the applicable law, including the Convention. Where interferences 
with the right to freedom of association are concerned, it follows from 
Article 9 of the Convention that religious communities are entitled to 
their own opinion on any collective activities of their members that 
might undermine their autonomy and that this opinion must in 
principle be respected by the national authorities. However, a mere 
allegation by a religious community that there is an actual or potential 
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threat to its autonomy is not sufficient to render any interference with 
its members’ trade-union rights compatible with the requirements of 
Article 11 of the Convention. It must also show, in the light of the 
circumstances of the individual case, that the risk alleged is real and 
substantial and that the impugned interference with freedom of 
association does not go beyond what is necessary to eliminate that risk 
and does not serve any other purpose unrelated to the exercise of the 
religious community’s autonomy. The national courts must ensure that 
these conditions are satisfied, by conducting an in-depth examination 
of the circumstances of the case and a thorough balancing exercise 
between the competing interests at stake .
82
 
 
By citing Schüth and Siebenhaar as authority for this approach, the Grand Chamber 
has also made clear that it considers it to be of general application to instances in 
which religious autonomy conflicts with other rights, rather than merely confined to 
Article 11.
83
 
 
A related point is that the strength of religious autonomy arguments is variable and it 
would be implausible to treat them all as of equal weight.
84
 Some activities are more 
obviously central to the practice of the right of freedom of religion protected under 
Article 9 than others.
85
 If a church engaged in commercial activities, for example 
running a coffee shop, this could obviously be inspired by its religious convictions 
and might be undertaken in a way that distinctively reflected them. But a claim that 
religious autonomy should provide exemption from general health and safety or food 
hygiene legislation applicable to such businesses instinctively looks weaker than in 
the case of an activity specifically referred to in Article 9 (‘worship, teaching, practice 
and observance’). The variable weight of autonomy claims is of course a factor that 
can be taken account of using a proportionality approach, whereas a definitional 
approach would require a simple boundary, with some activities included and others 
excluded from protection. 
 
 
A Different Approach: Reversibility and Clashing Rights 
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In this section I will elaborate how the reversibility test (mentioned in the 
Introduction) operates, when it applies and how it compares to other explanations of 
clashing rights. The section following will then apply it to the conflict of rights in 
Fernández- Martínez in order to demonstrate the insight that the test brings. 
 
It is important, first of all, however, not to conflate reversibility with definitional 
approaches in general. Some useful definitional approaches that can help resolve 
apparent clashing rights cases do not depend on reversibility. For example, it may 
help in determining the scope of a right to keep in mind that the more widely it is 
interpreted the greater of the probability of an interference with a third party’s rights. 
(An obvious example concerns the interface between privacy and freedom of 
expression.) Cases like this could of course also be resolved by proportional balancing 
but in a number of them it will be more straightforward to interpret the first right more 
narrowly because of the risk of impinging on the second.
86
 While this is certainly an 
argument in favour of clear differentiation between rights and uses an awareness of 
the effect of an expansive interpretation on another right, it is not reversibility strictly 
speaking.   
 
The reversibility test is intended as a tool of analysis in relation to application of ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’ limitations under Arts. 8.2, 9.2, 10.2 and 11.2 of the 
Convention. As Bomhoff has noted, the Strasbourg approach to these limitations is 
beset by three recurring weaknesses: a lack of clarity over the kind of rights that 
qualify, frequent vagueness over which precise right is in question and inconsistency 
over who can qualify as rights-holders.
87
 The text of the Convention itself is unhelpful 
since it does not specify what is to count as a ‘right’ or ‘freedom’ in these limitation 
clauses.  Responding to these concerns, as noted earlier, the reversibility test requires 
the Court to ask whether another identifiable victim would have an admissible 
Convention claim if the state were to ‘reverse’ the outcome by giving priority to the 
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less favoured right. If such a victim cannot be identified then the test suggests that no 
legitimate aim for a restriction exists. It follows that there is no need to consider 
questions to do with the legal quality or proportionality of the restriction. This is what 
can be termed the ‘pure reversibility’ argument (I will explain below a more qualified 
version) and it has several advantages.  
 
Before going further I should clarify,  however, that there are numerous instances in 
which the ECtHR has interpreted ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ more broadly 
than the reversibility test would allow, to refer to municipal  Constitutional or legal 
rights.  My argument is that these instances are largely unreflective and cannot be 
reconciled with the underlying purpose of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Instead, and to give the limitation its best interpretation, it should be confined 
to Convention rights. As Steven Greer has pointed out, the obligation on member 
states to secure protection of Convention rights and the deliberate omission of other 
rights from the Convention both imply that those included should be given priority 
over Constitutional or other legal rights.
88
 
  
The reversibility test can, I contend, cut through vague discussion of rights-conflict 
and help to explain why some of the Court’s most controversial decisions in the field 
of religion are problematic. For example, in Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria
89
 the 
majority of the Court held that the seizure and forfeiture of a satirical anti-religious 
film in the Tyrol did not contravene Article 10 since its purpose was the protection of 
the rights of others. In a Joint Dissenting Opinion Judges Palm, Pekannen and 
Makarczyk argued that a right to protection of religious feelings could not be derived 
from the right of freedom of religion under Article 9 since it included a right to 
express views critical of the religious opinions of others.
90
 Similarly, in justifying the 
prohibition in France on women wearing full-face veils in public spaces under Art. 9. 
2, the majority of the Grand Chamber in SAS v France referred to ‘the right of others 
to live in a space of socialisation that makes living together easier’.91 In their Joint 
Partly Dissenting Opinion Judges Nussberger and Jaderblom countered that that the 
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majority had failed to show which concrete rights of others could be inferred from the 
abstract principle of living together.
92
 Once it is recognised that there is no 
Convention right that the state prohibit anti-religious speech that some people find 
offensive or to look at the face of a by-passer on the street, the Court’s ’conflicting 
rights’ jurisprudence on blasphemy and religious dress lies discredited. If – as the 
reversibility test demonstrates in these cases – there is no legitimate aim that satisfies 
the Convention, all discussion of balancing rights by proportionality or within the 
margin of appreciation is seen to be a distracting irrelevance.  
 
The focus on identifying specific potential claimants (or ‘others’) is important for two 
reasons. Firstly, individual petitions under the Convention machinery do not 
otherwise lend themselves to examining the full complexity of conflicting rights since 
they reduce a complex situation to a one dimensional claim brought by one side 
against the state party. It is left to the state itself in effect to put the arguments of the 
absent affected persons, although occasionally the Court may allow participation of 
representative groups
93
 and this can help to fill the lacuna. By focusing on whether a 
conflicting Convention claim could be brought successfully, the reversibility test 
helps to concretise what is otherwise a hypothetical point. Secondly, identifying a 
specific potential applicant helps to accord rights their proper place within the 
Convention scheme, notably by counteracting a tendency to further expand the list of 
societal interests that can legitimately be used to limit qualified rights.
94
 One 
consequence would be to debar actions for the benefit of public authorities (such as 
public sector employers in employment cases) from being treated under ‘rights and 
freedoms of others’, since they are unable to petition the Court to defend their rights.95  
Reversibility also creates symmetry in the interpretation of the Convention by 
applying the same principles to limitation of rights as to interferences per se. This 
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allows Convention jurisprudence to be applied in a coherent, consistent and principled 
way that should also enhance predictability for applicants. As the Grand Chamber 
noted in Sindicatul ‘Pastorul Cel Bun’ the outcome in a conflicting rights case should 
not turn on which of the rights-holders brings the application.
96
  Closely related, by 
eliminating what Eva Brems calls ‘fake conflicts’ of rights,97 a stricter and more 
disciplined approach can be taken to limitations, which can then be more easily 
applied in a structured fashion and with less frequent recourse to the margin of 
appreciation.  
 
The reversibility approach is also more ordered in that it invites the establishment of 
clearer boundaries between the scope of different articles of the Convention. 
Eliminating overlap in this definitional way, rather than by proportional balancing, 
once again enhances consistency: in principle the scope for different outcomes to the 
same factual disputes under different provisions is minimized. Conversely applicants 
and their advisers will have less incentive to devise arguments to artificially squeeze 
facts within the scope of rights that are more generously interpreted. It is not possible 
of course to entirely eliminate all overlap because of the complexity of factual 
analyses of real life, but it is clear looking back that the development of Convention 
jurisprudence has been adversely affected by the historical reluctance to utilise some 
articles (notably Article 9 until the 1990s)
98
 while because of a more receptive judicial 
attitude the jurisprudence of others (especially Articles 8 and 10) have put on what 
can only be described as a growth spurt. The distinction between unqualified and 
qualified rights under the Convention means that there is an inherent gravitational pull 
or tactical incentive for applicants to frame their claims as an interference with 
unqualified rights wherever possible. Nonetheless where overlap between qualified 
rights is concerned (in particular Articles 8, 9 and 10) the above reasons for 
attempting to minimise overlap wherever possible are persuasive. 
 
The reversibility argument is particularly useful in helping to order actions that states 
have taken in defence of another person’s legal interests. Here the argument helps to 
explain why states should not have a free hand to override Convention rights by 
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choosing to grant additional (and in Convention terms, optional) legal rights to others. 
Where recognition of the supplementary rights is not a Convention requirement, logic 
suggests that the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ limitation should not be available to 
the state and that the first person’s Convention rights should prevail in the event of 
conflict. It might seem odd to conclude that state action taken in defence of another 
individual can be an impermissible interference with human rights. Nonetheless if the 
distinction between legal rights in general and fundamental rights is not maintained 
the overall protection of the Convention system is undermined and states will have 
greater latitude to interfere with rights in general. In such cases to pose the question 
whether protection of the ostensibly conflicting right is a Convention requirement is a 
useful corrective. It can help guard against judicial endorsement of vague limitations 
on rights that otherwise are likely to pass scrutiny under the margin of appreciation 
granted to states to ‘balance’ between the rights of the parties. 
 
Powerful as the reasons in favour of pure reversibility may be, there are, I concede, 
some hard cases that the test may struggle with. Firstly, it must be recognised that 
there are some genuinely complex cases involving clashing rights that cannot be 
resolved using the test. This is not to say that reversibility arguments are wholly 
irrelevant to such cases but, rather, to recognize that they may take a more qualified 
form. Secondly, there fields where the trend of Convention jurisprudence is already 
well-established and it is no longer realistically open to argue that the scope of one of 
the rights be narrowed by definitional or categorical reasoning. (I would place 
Martinez-Torrón’s criticisms of the applicability of Article 8 to voluntary choices 
about a priest choosing to establish a relationship and found a family in this 
category.
99
) Thirdly, and relatedly, some intellectual inconsistency has been sown by 
the generous approach to Article 14 taken by the Court in treating some matters as 
within the ‘ambit’ of substantive rights for the purpose on non-discrimination even 
where states have a discretion whether or not to fully recognise the right in 
question.
100
 Where the Court has behaved in this fashion to follow a pure reversibility 
approach is to risk further inconsistency. Fourthly – and this is in my view is the 
reason most directly relevant to the Fernández Martínez decision – the question may 
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not be one of straightforward clashes of rights between private parties that only 
concern the balance struck in legislation or by the domestic courts, but may also 
involve more complex state entanglement.  
  
In all these instances reversibility reasoning is still helpful, but in a more qualified 
way and at a later point in the inquiry (qualified reversibility). Thus, in assessing 
whether a limitation is necessary in a democratic society under Article 8(2), it is 
nonetheless relevant to consider whether it is mandatory or merely optional under the 
Convention for the state to defend the actions and interests of both parties on the facts 
in question. Following this line of argument, it would then be easier for a state to 
demonstrate the need for a limitation where qualified reversibility is satisfied. 
Conversely if protection of the conflicting right is not mandatory then it should weigh 
less heavily and the margin of appreciation would be correspondingly narrower.
101
 
 
Having set out the advantages of the reversibility test, the final section will apply it to 
the treatment of religious autonomy in the Fernández Martínez case by way of 
illustration. 
 
 
Applying the reversibility test in practice 
 
The treatment by both the minority and the majority of Mr. Fernández Martínez's 
claim perhaps only serves to obscure a crucial question about state-religion relations 
that the reversibility test lays bare. It is important to keep in mind two points: 1) that 
Spain has a Concordat with the Roman Catholic Church which, inter alia, allows for 
the system of ecclesiastical licensing of religious education teachers and 2) that a 
constitutional duty of religious neutrality applies to the Spanish state.   
As to the first point, there is little doubt on the basis of longstanding Convention 
jurisprudence that the Concordat is within the range of acceptable constitutional 
arrangements open to a member state, since there is no Convention blueprint for 
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religion-state relations.
102
 There is no difficulty therefore with the conclusion of the 
majority of the Grand Chamber that insofar as the non-renewal of the applicant’s 
teaching contract was based on the Agreement between Spain and the Holy See it 
could potentially satisfy the test of being ‘in accordance with law’ under Article 
8.2.
103
   
Nonetheless, in the case of such agreements, as with countries that have an 
established religion, care needs to be taken that the partnership between state and 
religion does not interfere with individual rights.
104
 On the one hand there is no 
obligation on the state to conclude a particular type of Concordat but, on the other 
hand, a member state is bound to observe an individual’s human rights. The existence 
of an arrangement between the state and a favoured religion cannot be allowed to 
override those rights. As the Joint Dissenting Opinion points out: ‘[T]his is an option 
freely chosen by the Spanish State. … the fact that the Ministry was bound by that 
decision results from the legal framework set up by the Spanish authorities 
themselves.’ 105 The status of the Concordat weakens the argument that a fully 
reversible Article 9 right was engaged on the facts: true if Mr. Fernández Martínez 
had been retained in his post religious autonomy as understood in Spain would have 
been interfered with.
106
 However this particular form of arrangement with the Spanish 
state was not one to which the church was entitled under the Convention. No credible 
Convention claim would have lain from the church authorities, therefore, had 
domestic law granted them no say in the appointment or dismissal of state religious 
education teachers. There is a distinction between state interference directly in 
decisions about the leadership, ordination or teaching within a religious body - 
something that clearly interferes with religious autonomy as interpreted under Article 
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9 
107
- and the question of whether or not state institutions must assist in implementing 
those decisions. The Church was able to decide that the applicant should no longer 
perform functions as a priest (as it had under the dispensation and as he himself had 
requested) but whether religious autonomy under Convention jurisprudence requires 
more than this is contentious. 
The reversibility test also has important implications for the argument advanced by 
Martinez-Torrón that consideration of the rights of others should have extended to the 
parental right under Article 2 of the Protocol 1 to have their children educated in 
accordance with their religious and philosophical convictions. Consideration of their 
interest in having their children taught Catholic doctrine by a teacher whose behaviour 
was consistent with the Church’s teaching and who had not attracted scandal does 
undoubtedly appear plausible, bearing in mind the rather imprecise way in which the 
Court often approaches ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. However, as with the 
weight given to the Concordat, on closer examination I would argue that it would be 
problematic and for similar reasons. The Convention jurisprudence does not support 
the underlying proposition that devout parents have a right that their children receive 
confessional religious education in state schools, even where (as in Spain) 
participation is voluntary.
108
 To the contrary, if anything confessional state religious 
education has a somewhat suspect status in the Court’s eyes, which has referred 
repeatedly to the requirement that state religious education should be critical, 
objective and pluralistic.
109
 Moreover, one could argue that parental interests under 
the Protocol are adequately protected by the voluntary nature of religious education 
classes – a parent unhappy with a particular teacher could simply withdraw their 
child. Dismissal of the teacher in question is not necessary and would be a 
disproportionate way of protecting parental interests. The reversibility test helps to 
demonstrate then that the particular arrangements that apply in Spanish law for 
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religious education are not sufficient reason to interfere with the Convention rights of 
a teacher in the position of Mr. Fernández Martínez.  
Finally, and for the sake of clarity, I should perhaps spell out what I am not arguing. It 
is not argued that the connections between the Spanish state and Catholic Church 
under the Concordat or in respect of religious education are intrinsically in violation 
of the European Convention of Human Rights. The point is simply that the 
Convention imposes limits on the reliance that the Spanish authorities can place on 
those arrangements where a teacher’s Convention rights are concerned. Were the 
arrangements different - if religious education teachers were employed by the Church 
rather than the state, for example - then no objection could be taken to the dismissal of 
a teacher like Mr. Fernández Martínez who had contradicted the Church’s norms and 
it would clearly constitute an interference with religious autonomy for a domestic or 
international court to treat the decision as violating the teacher’s rights. A case like 
that could easily be resolved by using a definitional approach along the lines 
advocated by Martinez-Torrón. But that was not the situation in Fernández Martínez 
and (like the minority of the Grand Chamber) I agree that it is the entanglement of 
Church and state in Spain that makes the difference. 
 
 
 
